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Secret Base - MLB has a triples problem
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About This Title
I’ve previously written about the prevalence of big league players/managers being completely oblivious to scenarios in which they’re representing an irrelevant run. Which is to say, for instance, a run in the 9th (or an extra) inning that doesn’t even carry any meaning or value unless at least one subsequent runner also scores. Well, there’s another inexplicable baserunning paradigm that’s even more prevalent, and it has to do with one of baseball’s coolest and rarest plays: the triple.
But as fun as triples are, if you’ve never thought about them on a deeper level beyond being cool, they so often inherently carry with them very little practicality. Depending on the number of outs in the inning, there are wildly different levels of value provided by turning a two-bagger into a three-bagger, and thus wildly different levels of risk that should be acceptable to embrace, based on said number of outs there are.
Allow me to elaborate: with no outs, triples are more valuable than doubles – but only by a little bit, since with no outs you’d still be quite likely to ultimately score from 2nd base with that much rope left to go in the inning. Triples are basically no more valuable than doubles if there are two outs because it’s not as though a groundout or deep flyout can score you from 3rd, and, on any traditional base hit, even slow baserunners are still exceedingly likely to score from 2nd since with two outs you get on your horse right on contact.
For the most part, the only advantage to being on 3rd base as opposed to 2nd if there are two outs is that you have the opportunity to score on an infield hit or if there’s a wild pitch/passed ball. A very, very microscopic edge.
So the true sweet spot, and the scenario where triples are by far the most practical and carry the most incentive, is when there’s exactly one out. With one out as opposed to no outs, you’re obviously significantly less likely to ultimately score from 2nd base (making one-out triples much more practical than no-out triples), and with one out as opposed to two outs, being at 3rd base also allows for the opportunity to score on a subsequent groundout or sac fly (making one-out triples much, much, much MUCH more practical than two-out triples).
Trying to stretch a double into a triple is worth embracing a certain level of risk if there’s one out. Unequivocally, it is worth embracing a much lower level of risk if there are zero outs, and it is worth embracing approximately zero risk if there are two outs. Making the 3rd out at 3rd is considered a cardinal sin for just that very reason (a team wouldn’t be unreasonable if they instituted a hard and fast rule that players – barring hitting a ball into the bleachers – are never ever ever allowed to take a single step past 2nd base if there are two outs).
You’d figure all these multi-billion dollar corporations known as Major League organizations would grasp this concept. That the players and coaches and managers themselves, at the highest level of the sport, would understand this very basic reality -- let alone with the modern infiltration of all the analytics departments. And yet that very plain and obvious reality does not in any way manifest itself in the historic baserunning behavior of big leaguers.
I’d posit that a rational triples distribution would see most of ‘em – something like at least 60% – occurring with exactly one out. Then perhaps ~35% with none out and at most 5% with two outs (and 100% of that 5% should be easy, obvious, stand-up triples). In reality? It is … not.
Baseball-reference has full play-by-play data going back to 1969, and across that 58-year sample, not only have there not been way more one-out triples than no-out triples, or even two-out triples, the distribution of MLB’s 49,915 triples is basically even! There have actually somehow even been over 1,000 more no-out triples than one-out triples.
This couldn’t be more irrational, and necessarily means so many things that are worth rattling off. It necessarily belies the aforementioned truism that, based on how many outs there are, triples provide wildly different levels of value, and therefore wildly different levels of risk that should be acceptable to embrace. It also necessarily means big leaguers and teams, all throughout history and continuing to this day and ostensibly until the sun burns out, have operated in a manner as though the 2nd-base-to-3rd-base upgrade with one out is basically no more valuable than the 2nd-to-3rd upgrade with two outs or, conversely, that a 2nd-to-3rd upgrade with two outs is just as valuable as a 2nd-to-3rd upgrade with one out. It’s insane I tell you! … [the most exasperated of screaming].
It also necessarily means that there have been thousands and thousands of instances with no outs -- and especially two outs -- in which big leaguers tried to stretch doubles into triples when, even if they did so successfully, still entailed embracing an unacceptable level of risk. (let alone all the instances of guys getting excruciatingly thrown out at 3rd in their futile attempt for a two-out triple) and/or that there have been thousands and thousands of one-out instances in which guys stopped at 2nd for a double when they should’ve tried to take 3rd.
In other words, if there’s one out, and a baserunner gets thrown out at 3rd trying to stretch a double into a triple, barring the egregious you can likely chalk it up to a worthwhile gamble that happened to not pan out. But if there’s two outs? Absolutely, positively never ever ever ever even in the slightest bit acceptable or defensible.
So who are the biggest player and team offenders of this common sense that clearly ain’t common? We don’t even have to go to prehistoric days where all sorts of dumb shit abounds in all sports. If I were to ask baseball fans what they think of first when they think of the ‘04 Yankees, I bet just about all would say that they blew a 3-0 lead in the ALCS. I would’ve too … before I discovered that just one (1) of their twenty (20) triples occurred with one out. Now that will forever be the first thing that pops in my mind when I think of them. That’s way more nuts than losing four baseball games in a row.
And lest one chalk that up to being a small sample, I’d actually argue the opposite. 20 triples is a massive sample to have as few as 5% of ‘em occur with one out. It is essentially a statistical certainty that they hit many one-out doubles that should’ve been triples and/or that many of their 19 triples hit with no outs or (especially) two outs entailed embracing way too much risk, regardless of having reached 3rd base safely.
Fast forward 18 years, and not only did just four (4) of the ‘22 Dodgers’ thirty-one (31) triples occur with just one out (12.9%), but twenty (20) of ‘em occurred with two outs (64.5%). That is completely ass-backwards. Even if the ‘04 Yanks and ‘22 Dodgers happened to hit fewer triple-y balls when there happened to be one out, given the wildly disparate value levels of triples tied to number of outs, it would have to have been to a statistically unrealistic degree in that regard to render that distribution to be anywhere close to the same universe as justifiable.
As for individuals, I’m definitely blown away by the archaic Joe Judge not only pulling off a 15-triple season in 1917 in which just one occurred with one out, but doing so again five years later. However, without a shadow of a doubt the true king of the unpractical triple is former Twins and Nationals centerfielder Denard Span. Going back to at least 1949 (and quite possibly longer but for play-by-play gaps precluding definitive declaration), there have been just seven instances of a player hitting at least 10 triples in a season, of which none occurred with one out. Denard is the proud owner of the two of the seven.
However even that fails to adequately contextualize exactly what he pulled off. Span, appropriately, authored the most truly epic span from 9/1/09 - 5/14/17 in which he hit 46 triples, and mystifyingly, just four occurred with one out. The sliding scale of just how much more valuable triples are with exactly one out combined with a triple sample as big as 46 combined with a one-out triples percentage as minuscule as just 8.7 is too maddening to comprehend. As a leadoff hitter, he hit with no outs more than a third of the time, though not nearly enough to even approach justifying such a distribution, especially given that nearly half of the remaining 42 triples occurred with two outs.
But while Span may reign as the top-tier offender, there are some other guys who had quite a bizarro triples distribution in their own right, existing just a tier below. Both Gerald Young and outfielder-turned-pitcher Anthony Gose had just one of their 19 career triples occur with one out, with 13 of Gose’s coming with two outs. Meanwhile Young, in trying to turn a double into a triple, was also thrown out at 3rd base not once but twice. Not only did neither occur with one out, which would elicit maximum understanding, but both occurred with two outs, meaning not a morsel of understanding … cardinal sin … shame, etc.
Whit Merrifield cranks the volume a bit, with just three of 29 career triples occurring with one out, and Tim Raines ups it way more, having hit just 21 of his 113 career triples with one out. While, as a leadoff hitter, 41.5% of Raines’ career plate appearances were with no outs, even on a rate basis he inexplicably hit triples far more frequently with two outs and especially no outs than he did with one out. If you desire a higher-volume non-leadoff hitter who had a more even distribution of plate appearances as to number of outs, allow me to point out Luis Gonzalez somehow hit just 12 of his 68 career triples with one out.
As for an emphasis not on dearth of one-out triples relative to non-one out triples (given that one out represents by far the most pragmatic scenario to try for a triple), but instead on abundance of two-out triples relative to non-two out triples (given that two outs represent by far the least pragmatic scenario to try for a triple and should for all intents and purposes never happen), four strike me as most amusing:
• each of Chris Iannetta’s first eight career triples happened with two outs
It cannot be overstated enough just how little advantage there is to being at 3rd base as opposed to 2nd if there are two outs. Practically speaking, with two down there’s basically never a good reason to take 3rd, especially if it’s a close enough play that it simply necessitates a slide. Even if the runner is ultimately safe, let alone actually getting thrown out. And yet that exact cardinal sin – making the 3rd out at 3rd – has occurred countless times when there’s no rational reason for that to have ever happened even once (outside of a double steal) throughout the 47-million year history of Major League Baseball.
The fact that historically there’s no significant difference in volume as to the distribution of one-out triples vs. two-out triples – a behavior which gobsmackingly conveys a belief that two-out triples are just as valuable as one-out triples and that the same amount of risk is acceptable to embrace – is a truly unbelievable league-wide phenomenon that represents a monumental indictment against the entire baseball industry to grasp the most basic risk/reward calculus. It truly is, aside from aggressive baserunning in irrelevant run scenarios, the biggest slap in the face imaginable to the logic gods. Do better, MLB!
I’ve previously written about the prevalence of big league players/managers being completely oblivious to scenarios in which they’re representing an irrelevant run. Which is to say, for instance, a run in the 9th (or an extra) inning that doesn’t even carry any meaning or value unless at least one subsequent runner also scores. Well, there’s another inexplicable baserunning paradigm that’s even more prevalent, and it has to do with one of baseball’s coolest and rarest plays: the triple.
But as fun as triples are, if you’ve never thought about them on a deeper level beyond being cool, they so often inherently carry with them very little practicality. Depending on the number of outs in the inning, there are wildly different levels of value provided by turning a two-bagger into a three-bagger, and thus wildly different levels of risk that should be acceptable to embrace, based on said number of outs there are.
Allow me to elaborate: with no outs, triples are more valuable than doubles – but only by a little bit, since with no outs you’d still be quite likely to ultimately score from 2nd base with that much rope left to go in the inning. Triples are basically no more valuable than doubles if there are two outs because it’s not as though a groundout or deep flyout can score you from 3rd, and, on any traditional base hit, even slow baserunners are still exceedingly likely to score from 2nd since with two outs you get on your horse right on contact.
For the most part, the only advantage to being on 3rd base as opposed to 2nd if there are two outs is that you have the opportunity to score on an infield hit or if there’s a wild pitch/passed ball. A very, very microscopic edge.
So the true sweet spot, and the scenario where triples are by far the most practical and carry the most incentive, is when there’s exactly one out. With one out as opposed to no outs, you’re obviously significantly less likely to ultimately score from 2nd base (making one-out triples much more practical than no-out triples), and with one out as opposed to two outs, being at 3rd base also allows for the opportunity to score on a subsequent groundout or sac fly (making one-out triples much, much, much MUCH more practical than two-out triples).
Trying to stretch a double into a triple is worth embracing a certain level of risk if there’s one out. Unequivocally, it is worth embracing a much lower level of risk if there are zero outs, and it is worth embracing approximately zero risk if there are two outs. Making the 3rd out at 3rd is considered a cardinal sin for just that very reason (a team wouldn’t be unreasonable if they instituted a hard and fast rule that players – barring hitting a ball into the bleachers – are never ever ever allowed to take a single step past 2nd base if there are two outs).
You’d figure all these multi-billion dollar corporations known as Major League organizations would grasp this concept. That the players and coaches and managers themselves, at the highest level of the sport, would understand this very basic reality -- let alone with the modern infiltration of all the analytics departments. And yet that very plain and obvious reality does not in any way manifest itself in the historic baserunning behavior of big leaguers.
I’d posit that a rational triples distribution would see most of ‘em – something like at least 60% – occurring with exactly one out. Then perhaps ~35% with none out and at most 5% with two outs (and 100% of that 5% should be easy, obvious, stand-up triples). In reality? It is … not.
Baseball-reference has full play-by-play data going back to 1969, and across that 58-year sample, not only have there not been way more one-out triples than no-out triples, or even two-out triples, the distribution of MLB’s 49,915 triples is basically even! There have actually somehow even been over 1,000 more no-out triples than one-out triples.
This couldn’t be more irrational, and necessarily means so many things that are worth rattling off. It necessarily belies the aforementioned truism that, based on how many outs there are, triples provide wildly different levels of value, and therefore wildly different levels of risk that should be acceptable to embrace. It also necessarily means big leaguers and teams, all throughout history and continuing to this day and ostensibly until the sun burns out, have operated in a manner as though the 2nd-base-to-3rd-base upgrade with one out is basically no more valuable than the 2nd-to-3rd upgrade with two outs or, conversely, that a 2nd-to-3rd upgrade with two outs is just as valuable as a 2nd-to-3rd upgrade with one out. It’s insane I tell you! … [the most exasperated of screaming].
It also necessarily means that there have been thousands and thousands of instances with no outs -- and especially two outs -- in which big leaguers tried to stretch doubles into triples when, even if they did so successfully, still entailed embracing an unacceptable level of risk. (let alone all the instances of guys getting excruciatingly thrown out at 3rd in their futile attempt for a two-out triple) and/or that there have been thousands and thousands of one-out instances in which guys stopped at 2nd for a double when they should’ve tried to take 3rd.
In other words, if there’s one out, and a baserunner gets thrown out at 3rd trying to stretch a double into a triple, barring the egregious you can likely chalk it up to a worthwhile gamble that happened to not pan out. But if there’s two outs? Absolutely, positively never ever ever ever even in the slightest bit acceptable or defensible.
So who are the biggest player and team offenders of this common sense that clearly ain’t common? We don’t even have to go to prehistoric days where all sorts of dumb shit abounds in all sports. If I were to ask baseball fans what they think of first when they think of the ‘04 Yankees, I bet just about all would say that they blew a 3-0 lead in the ALCS. I would’ve too … before I discovered that just one (1) of their twenty (20) triples occurred with one out. Now that will forever be the first thing that pops in my mind when I think of them. That’s way more nuts than losing four baseball games in a row.
And lest one chalk that up to being a small sample, I’d actually argue the opposite. 20 triples is a massive sample to have as few as 5% of ‘em occur with one out. It is essentially a statistical certainty that they hit many one-out doubles that should’ve been triples and/or that many of their 19 triples hit with no outs or (especially) two outs entailed embracing way too much risk, regardless of having reached 3rd base safely.
Fast forward 18 years, and not only did just four (4) of the ‘22 Dodgers’ thirty-one (31) triples occur with just one out (12.9%), but twenty (20) of ‘em occurred with two outs (64.5%). That is completely ass-backwards. Even if the ‘04 Yanks and ‘22 Dodgers happened to hit fewer triple-y balls when there happened to be one out, given the wildly disparate value levels of triples tied to number of outs, it would have to have been to a statistically unrealistic degree in that regard to render that distribution to be anywhere close to the same universe as justifiable.
As for individuals, I’m definitely blown away by the archaic Joe Judge not only pulling off a 15-triple season in 1917 in which just one occurred with one out, but doing so again five years later. However, without a shadow of a doubt the true king of the unpractical triple is former Twins and Nationals centerfielder Denard Span. Going back to at least 1949 (and quite possibly longer but for play-by-play gaps precluding definitive declaration), there have been just seven instances of a player hitting at least 10 triples in a season, of which none occurred with one out. Denard is the proud owner of the two of the seven.
However even that fails to adequately contextualize exactly what he pulled off. Span, appropriately, authored the most truly epic span from 9/1/09 - 5/14/17 in which he hit 46 triples, and mystifyingly, just four occurred with one out. The sliding scale of just how much more valuable triples are with exactly one out combined with a triple sample as big as 46 combined with a one-out triples percentage as minuscule as just 8.7 is too maddening to comprehend. As a leadoff hitter, he hit with no outs more than a third of the time, though not nearly enough to even approach justifying such a distribution, especially given that nearly half of the remaining 42 triples occurred with two outs.
But while Span may reign as the top-tier offender, there are some other guys who had quite a bizarro triples distribution in their own right, existing just a tier below. Both Gerald Young and outfielder-turned-pitcher Anthony Gose had just one of their 19 career triples occur with one out, with 13 of Gose’s coming with two outs. Meanwhile Young, in trying to turn a double into a triple, was also thrown out at 3rd base not once but twice. Not only did neither occur with one out, which would elicit maximum understanding, but both occurred with two outs, meaning not a morsel of understanding … cardinal sin … shame, etc.
Whit Merrifield cranks the volume a bit, with just three of 29 career triples occurring with one out, and Tim Raines ups it way more, having hit just 21 of his 113 career triples with one out. While, as a leadoff hitter, 41.5% of Raines’ career plate appearances were with no outs, even on a rate basis he inexplicably hit triples far more frequently with two outs and especially no outs than he did with one out. If you desire a higher-volume non-leadoff hitter who had a more even distribution of plate appearances as to number of outs, allow me to point out Luis Gonzalez somehow hit just 12 of his 68 career triples with one out.
As for an emphasis not on dearth of one-out triples relative to non-one out triples (given that one out represents by far the most pragmatic scenario to try for a triple), but instead on abundance of two-out triples relative to non-two out triples (given that two outs represent by far the least pragmatic scenario to try for a triple and should for all intents and purposes never happen), four strike me as most amusing:
• each of Chris Iannetta’s first eight career triples happened with two outs
It cannot be overstated enough just how little advantage there is to being at 3rd base as opposed to 2nd if there are two outs. Practically speaking, with two down there’s basically never a good reason to take 3rd, especially if it’s a close enough play that it simply necessitates a slide. Even if the runner is ultimately safe, let alone actually getting thrown out. And yet that exact cardinal sin – making the 3rd out at 3rd – has occurred countless times when there’s no rational reason for that to have ever happened even once (outside of a double steal) throughout the 47-million year history of Major League Baseball.
The fact that historically there’s no significant difference in volume as to the distribution of one-out triples vs. two-out triples – a behavior which gobsmackingly conveys a belief that two-out triples are just as valuable as one-out triples and that the same amount of risk is acceptable to embrace – is a truly unbelievable league-wide phenomenon that represents a monumental indictment against the entire baseball industry to grasp the most basic risk/reward calculus. It truly is, aside from aggressive baserunning in irrelevant run scenarios, the biggest slap in the face imaginable to the logic gods. Do better, MLB!
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